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Abstract
There is a renewed interest in the dynamic e⁄ects of tax cuts on gov-
ernment revenue. The possibility of tax cuts paying for themselves over
time de￿nitely seems like an attractive option for policy makers.
This paper looks at what conditions are required for reductions in
capital taxes to be fully self-￿nancing. This is done in a model with
constant returns to scale in broad capital. Such a framework exhibits
growth; the scope for self-￿nancing tax cuts is therefore di⁄erent than
in the neoclassical growth model, most recently studied by Mankiw and
Weinzierl (2006).
Compared to previous literature, I make a methodological contribution
in the de￿nition of "La⁄er e⁄ects" and clarify the role of compositional and
dynamic e⁄ects in making tax cuts self-￿nancing. I also provide simple
analytical expressions for what tax rates are required for tax cuts to be
fully self-￿nancing.
The results show that large distortions are required to get La⁄er ef-
fects. Introducing a labor/leisure choice into the model opens up a new
avenue for such e⁄ects, however.
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11 Introduction
There is a renewed interest in the dynamic e⁄ects of tax cuts. This is at least
in part due to the recent tax cuts in the US. Methods for not only including
"micro" behavioral e⁄ects but also dynamic "macro" e⁄ects of tax cuts in the
US budget process are being discussed (Auerbach, 2006). In a recent paper,
Mankiw and Weinzierl provide "back of the envelope" calculations comparing
static and dynamic "scoring" for the neoclassical growth model. They argue that
tax cuts can, through a new higher steady state level of capital and therefore
a larger tax base, to a large extent pay for themselves (Mankiw and Weinzierl,
2006). Leeper and Yang (2007) show that such conclusions can only be drawn
with speci￿c assumptions regarding government spending.
This paper follows a di⁄erent literature than the two papers above and stud-
ies e⁄ects from tax cuts in a model with constant returns to scale in broad cap-
ital. These models are di⁄erent from the neoclassical growth model studied by
Mankiw and Weinzierl. Since they display "endogenous" long-run growth, the
scope for dynamic e⁄ects is di⁄erent1.
I develop a tractable framework introducing human capital and a labor/leisure
choice in the AK-model to make three main points. First, I further de￿ne "Laf-
fer e⁄ects" in the constant returns models by dividing e⁄ects of tax cuts into
dynamic and compositional e⁄ects. This is crucial when there is more than
one factor of production. Second, simple analytical expressions for when tax
cuts in AK-style models will fully ￿nance themselves are provided. Third, I
follow both the endogenous growth literature and Mankiw and Weinzierl and
add a labor/leisure choice to the agent￿ s decision and study how the scope for
self-￿nancing tax cuts changes.
Having added leisure to the model, we have a framework with three incentive
margins that, as a result of tax cuts, can create La⁄er e⁄ects on their own or
in combination. The three incentive margins are 1) dynamic e⁄ects of taxes on
interest and growth rates, 2) compositional e⁄ects of taxes on production (an
"uneven playing ￿eld"2) and 3) the labor/leisure choice. In a world with the
￿rst ￿dynamic ￿e⁄ect only, there is a direct revenue e⁄ect of a tax cut and an
indirect e⁄ect of di⁄erent interest and growth rates. The second ￿compositional
￿e⁄ect comes in when we tax physical and human capital di⁄erently; the current
tax base is then also a⁄ected by tax cuts, adding to the direct revenue e⁄ect
and the growth e⁄ect. Adding the third margin ￿leisure ￿there is an additional
e⁄ect on the tax base through a di⁄erent labor/leisure choice after a tax cut
and there is also an additional growth e⁄ect.
1There are thus, broadly speaking, two strands of literature: a neoclassical growth literature
and an "endogenous" growth literature. As the neoclassical and endogenous growth models
have di⁄erent long-run properties, the analysis of dynamic e⁄ects of tax cuts is also likely to
di⁄er.
2Goulder and Thalmann (1993) among others use this term to describe the e⁄ects of uneven
taxation on di⁄erent types of capital.
2In this setup, I derive what combinations of tax rates on physical and human
capital are required for a tax cut to be self-￿nancing. The results suggest that
dynamic and compositional distortions will need to be large if there are to be
La⁄er e⁄ects; less so, however, if the model contains a labor/leisure choice. I
show that the margin opened up by the endogenous labor/leisure choice may
be quantitatively important.
Regarding terminology and main scope, this paper follows the tradition of
the "endogenous" growth literature and studies "La⁄er e⁄ects" rather than "dy-
namic scoring". This means that we are interested in when tax cuts can fully
￿nance themselves, maintaining government spending3. I derive conditions for
what starting point of tax rates is required for tax cuts to be fully self-￿nancing.
As shown by Agell and Persson (2001) and as further detailed here, "maintain-
ing government spending" must be accurately de￿ned and several cases arise.
Speci￿cally, I add one de￿nition of La⁄er e⁄ects to the de￿nitions provided by
these authors.
Much of the earlier literature on taxation in "endogenous" growth models
has focused on growth e⁄ects of taxation in CRTS two-sector models with phys-
ical and human capital, e.g. Lucas (1988), King and Rebelo (1990), Rebelo
(1991), Pecorino (1993, 1994), Stokey and Rebelo (1995) and Milesi-Ferretti
and Roubini (1998a, 1998b). A key aspect of all these papers, as well as of the
few studies of La⁄er e⁄ects, is that in almost all speci￿cations, the return to
capital and the growth rate are a⁄ected by tax cuts. Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini
(1998a, 1998b) clarify the role that di⁄erent model assumptions have on growth
responses from taxation for these two-sector models4.
Ireland (1994) and Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) study dynamic La⁄er e⁄ects
in the one-sector AK-model and Novales and Ruiz (2002) in a two-sector model.
Agell and Persson (2001) clarify the role of di⁄erent assumptions regarding
"maintaining government spending" in explaining why Ireland and Bruce and
Turnovsky get seemingly di⁄erent results.
This paper extends the study of La⁄er e⁄ects from the one-sector AK models
towards the two-sector models. For this purpose, I add human capital and a
3As the direct revenue e⁄ects of tax cuts are negative, government bonds function as the
means of intertemporal ￿nancing. In the long run, government bonds must obey a transversal-
ity condition. This analysis di⁄ers from the analysis by Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) where
an atemporal government budget constraint is always obeyed. Their study of "scoring" is
therefore di⁄erent from the study of La⁄er e⁄ects. There is also a literature, related to both
scoring and La⁄er e⁄ects, comparing the level of present value government revenue along
balanced growth paths for di⁄erent sets of tax rates in calibrated endogenous growth models
(Pecorino, 1995; Bianconi, 2000).
4Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998a, 1998b) study the balanced growth path responses to
taxation in a full catalogue of models that have been used in the literature; they investigate
di⁄erent speci￿cations of leisure, the importance of human capital being a market- (taxed) or
home (untaxed) activity and the di⁄erent cases arising depending on what the human capital
production function looks like.
3leisure choice to the one-sector AK-framework. For analytical tractability, I ￿rst
add human capital and work out the e⁄ects and then, in a later section, add the
leisure decision to the model. The framework has the considerable advantage of
there being no transitional dynamics. The economy "jumps" from one growth
path to another as a result of tax cuts, thereby facilitating the analysis of La⁄er
e⁄ects5,6.
Section 2 outlines the basic model. La⁄er e⁄ects are de￿ned in section 3. The
conditions for La⁄er e⁄ects are derived and discussed in section 4. In the model
description until section 4, the ￿rst two e⁄ects of taxation, the dynamic e⁄ect
and the compositional e⁄ect from above, are present in the analysis. Section
5 introduces the third e⁄ect of taxation by endogenizing the leisure decision
and shows how this additional incentive margin a⁄ects the scope for La⁄er
e⁄ects. Section 6 summarizes and discusses the results. A list of all variables
and parameters are included in the appendix. In the appendix, the relationship
between the model to the general two-sector model with human and physical
capital is also discussed. Finally, the level of leisure in a special case is solved
for.
2 The model
I set up a perfect foresight and full commitment model with utility maximizing
agents holding physical and human capital. Agents derive utility from con-
sumption. The capital is rented out to ￿rms and agents pay tax on the returns
to their capital stocks. The government uses tax receipts to ￿nance lump-sum
transfers and government consumption. Having set up the model, I de￿ne La⁄er
e⁄ects in section 3 and in section 4 then ask: what combination of tax rates is
required for the government to be able to reduce a tax rate but still maintain
its spending paths?
2.1 Production and capital
The model used in this paper is a modi￿ed AK-model, a one-sector model with
physical and human capital in the production function. It has constant returns
5In order to analytically isolate the three incentive margins I impose (1) the restriction of
one common production function for physical and human capital and (2) no restriction on
deinvestment in either type of capital. The assumptions imply that a two-sector model with
equal production functions for physical and human capital collapses into the one-sector model
presented here. There will be no transitional dynamics since adjustments to tax changes are
immediate. There are growth e⁄ects, though.
6Novales and Ruiz (2002) parametrize a version of the two-sector model with physical and
human capital and use numerical methods to study La⁄er e⁄ects.
4to scale in physical capital K and human capital H altogether. The production
function for physical as well as human capital is F(K;H) = AK￿H1￿￿, i.e.
Cobb-Douglas7 with 0 < ￿ < 1.
Output in the economy is used for consumption or for building physical and
human capital stocks. It is then assumed that output can be directly used for
both physical capital build-up and human capital build-up and that one unit
of physical capital can be converted into one unit of human capital. It is also
assumed that investment in physical capital and human capital can be negative
and immediate. This implies that capital stocks can "jump" from one level to
another; the aggregate of physical and human capital cannot jump, however. In
e⁄ect, there is thus one aggregate capital stock, de￿ned in per-capita terms as
zt = kt + ht, where t is a time index8.
2.2 Representative agent optimization
Agents derive utility from consumption and have an in￿nite time horizon. Util-
ity maximizing agents sell their physical and human capital to pro￿t maximizing
￿rms and receive factor returns. The agent also receives a lump-sum transfer
from the government and returns from government bonds. Income is spent on
consumption or invested in the assets of the economy, physical and human cap-
ital and government bonds. Income is also used to pay taxes on the returns on
these assets. The government uses tax receipts to ￿nance government consump-
tion and lump-sum transfers to the agents. Depreciation rates are set at zero
and there is no population growth.
Before solving the representative agent￿ s optimal consumption path, we de-
rive his return to capital. Firms rent physical and human capital from the
agents in order to maximize their pro￿ts with respect to inputs kt and ht. The
per-capita production function is f(kt;ht) = Ak￿
t h
1￿￿
t . From the competitive
equilibrium condition that rt = @f=@kt and wt = @f=@ht, where rt is the re-
turn on physical capital and wt is the return on human capital, the standard
arbitrage condition of equal after-tax returns on kt and ht becomes
rt(1 ￿ ￿k) = wt(1 ￿ ￿h); (1)
where ￿k and ￿h are taxes on returns to physical and human capital, respectively.
7Stokey and Rebelo (1995) use the more general CES production function studying growth
e⁄ects from tax rates and conclude that the elasticities of substitution in production are
relatively unimportant.
8Our model is equivalent to a two-sector model with equal production functions for phys-
ical and human capital and no restrictions on deinvestment of k and h. As a result of our
assumptions, we get a framework where responses to tax cuts are immediate. Absent transi-
tional dynamics between the old and new growth paths, we are then able to decompose the
e⁄ects of tax cuts into compositional and dynamic e⁄ects. In the appendix, we discuss the
relation between our model and the two-sector models. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)
for a presentation of the model used here.
5Condition (1) allows us to de￿ne the agent￿ s after tax return to capital (k;h
as well as z) to become
￿ ￿ rt(1 ￿ ￿k) = A￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿k)￿(1 ￿ ￿h)1￿￿: (2)
This return ￿ will also be the return paid by the government on the stock
of government bonds, de￿ned as bt
9. The agent￿ s total wealth, de￿ned as Wt ￿
zt + bt, thus earns the return ￿.






_ Wt = ￿Wt + Tt ￿ ct; where W0 = z0 + b0: (3)
There is also a transversality condition. U (ct;Gt) is the instantaneous utility
function, ct is private consumption, Gt is government consumption, ￿ is the
time preference factor of the agent, Tt are lump-sum transfers received from
the government, z0 is period-zero total capital and b0 is period-zero government
bonds10. Dotted variables are time derivatives. Time indices will normally be
suppressed. The utility function is additively separable in private consumption
c and government consumption G, U (c;G) = u(c)+v(G) where u(c) takes the





where ￿ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Attaching
the dynamic Lagrange multiplier ￿ to the budget constraint in (3), using control
c and state W, the ￿rst-order conditions of this problem are
u0 (c)e￿￿t = ￿ (5)
￿￿ = ￿_ ￿ (6)
9The return from bonds is taxed with the physical capital tax ￿k, so that the pre-tax return
to bonds Rt would be determined by ￿ = Rt(1 ￿ ￿k):
10Regarding notation, we use capital letters for government spending variables, i.e. transfers
T and government consumption G. We use W for per-capita wealth in order to not confuse
it with the return to human capital, w. Small letters are used for all other stocks and ￿ows.
We use the capital letter A in the production function because of the resemblance with the
AK-model.
6and the transversality condition is limt!1￿tWt = 0.







(￿ ￿ ￿): (7)
The growth rate of consumption ￿ depends on the degree of intertemporal
substitution ￿ ￿ ￿
￿1, the after-tax return on capital ￿ (from 2) and the time
preference factor ￿. The degree of intertemporal substitution has the usual in-
terpretation: an agent with a low degree of intertemporal substitution prefers a
stable consumption path and will not react to tax changes to any considerable
extent. A low after-tax return ￿ will discourage investment and slow growth.
So will a high degree of impatience (￿ high) of the agent, because future con-
sumption ￿ ows are less valued. Taxes on physical and human capital a⁄ect the
growth rate, through ￿, to the same degree as physical and human capital a⁄ect
total output. Reductions in ￿k and ￿h make investment more productive and
hence increase the growth rate, @￿=@￿k < 0 and @￿=@￿h < 0.11
2.3 Composition e⁄ect, return to capital and total pro-
duction
Since we will work with compositional as well as dynamic e⁄ects from tax cuts,
we need to keep track of how tax changes a⁄ect the composition of the human-
to-physical capital stocks and how this a⁄ects production and returns to capital.
This section therefore discusses three variables that will be important in what
follows: the agent￿ s h=k-ratio, the private return to capital ￿ (from above) and
the economy-wide return to capital.










￿ is the ratio between h and k for an optimizing agent. A lower ￿ makes k
less important in production increasing the h-to-k ratio. An increase in ￿k has
the same e⁄ect12.
11The transversality condition limt!1￿tWt = 0 implies that the consumption growth rate
must be smaller than the private return on capital; ￿￿￿ > 0. For values of ￿ above or equal to
unity, this condition is always satis￿ed. Below unity we require A￿￿(1￿￿)1￿￿(1￿￿k)￿(1￿
￿h)1￿￿ < (1 ￿ ￿)￿1 ￿.
12As seen in (2), a higher ￿k reduces ￿ with the factor (1 ￿ ￿k)￿ and not (1 ￿ ￿k). Since
h=k increases, physical capital k becomes more scarce and its return r goes up, partly but not
fully compensating the e⁄ect of the tax cut on the private return and growth.
7In interpreting ￿, note that maximizing output Ak￿h1￿￿ subject to the
constraint h + k = z would yield a ratio h=k = (1 ￿ ￿)=￿. The agent￿ s h=k
ratio and therefore what is used for production di⁄ers from this value as soon
as ￿h 6= ￿k. A di⁄erentiated tax treatment of h and k thus adds the second
e⁄ect discussed in the introduction, a compositional distortion in production,
to the ￿rst e⁄ect, the dynamic distortion always present when capital is taxed.
This compositional distortion from a di⁄erentiated capital taxation is important
in the analysis of La⁄er e⁄ects. We can see this importance by de￿ning the








A￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿k)￿(1 ￿ ￿h)1￿￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿k) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿h)
: (9)
It can be shown that the economy-wide return to capital ￿, with one tax
rate given, is at its maximum when the second tax is set equal to the ￿rst tax.
Otherwise, ￿ is below its maximum value. ￿ is nothing else than the de facto
production factor in the economy which we see by rewriting Ak￿h1￿￿ as follows:
Ak￿h1￿￿ = ￿z: (10)
Total production is therefore tax-dependent, a feature which is absent in
standard one-sector AK-models. An uneven taxation means a suboptimal use
of resources and therefore lower production. Consequently, a reduction in the
highest tax will decrease this distortion and production will jump to a higher
level, which will open up a new margin for La⁄er e⁄ects13.
For future reference, also note that
￿ = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿avg); (11)
where the "average tax rate" ￿avg ￿ ￿￿k +(1￿￿)￿h has been used. Whereas ￿
is the economy-wide return to capital, the agents face the (lower) private return
￿ because taxes must be paid. Without taxes, the returns are equal14.
13In our framework, there are no traditional dynamics but immediate adjustment in the
h=k-ratio as a result of tax cuts. If we had a more general model with di⁄erent production
functions for physical and human capital, we would get transitional dynamics as a result
of tax cuts but still, along a balanced growth path, a constant h=k-ratio. There is still a
compositional reoptimization as a response to tax cuts. It would not be immediate, however.
As will be discussed in detail in the following section, the tax cuts that will be considered are
such that we reduce the highest tax and hence, increase GDP.
14We use the term "economy-wide" to refer to the pre-tax return to capital in the economy.
82.4 Intertemporal constraints
Throughout the analysis of La⁄er e⁄ects, the tools of analysis will be the con-
sumption rule and the present value resource constraint. These will describe
how the representative agent responds to tax changes and, as a result, what
scope there is for La⁄er e⁄ects. The consumption rule is derived by integrating
the budget constraint
_ W = ￿W + T ￿ c: (12)
The present value budget constraint, using initial total wealth W0 = z0 +b0
and ct = c0e￿t from (7) and applying the transversality condition, becomes
c0
￿ ￿ ￿




where c0 is period-zero private consumption. This relationship says that the
present value of consumption should be equal to initial assets plus the present
value of transfers received from the government. We get the consumption rule
by multiplying through by (￿ ￿ ￿),
c0 = (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿






This consumption rule, which depends both on the transfer and the tax
policy of the government, will be used to study how government consumption
can vary with tax rates complying with the economy￿ s resource constraint. In
the resource constraint, the production of the economy is either consumed by
the government or by the agents or added to the stocks of k and h, Ak￿h1￿￿ =
c + G + _ k + _ h. With GDP written as ￿z (from 10), the resource constraint
becomes
_ z = ￿z ￿ c ￿ G; (15)
and the present value resource constraint, using initial capital z0 and ct = c0e￿t
and applying the transversality condition, becomes
It is di⁄erent, however, from the ￿rst-best (social) return as long as taxes are di⁄erentiated.
In the AK-model, the private return would be A(1 ￿ ￿k) and the economy-wide (and social)








The constraint says that the present value of total consumption must equal
initial resources. Note that it is the "economy-wide" discount rate ￿ which is
of importance for the use of resources, whereas it is the private return ￿ that
determines the behavior of the agent in the consumption rule.
We have now derived the tools to study La⁄er e⁄ects, i.e. the tools for
studying how government spending reacts to tax cuts and if it will be possible
to "maintain government spending" after tax cuts. In the following sections,
di⁄erent versions of expressions (14) and (16) will be di⁄erentiated with respect
to tax rates in order to study La⁄er e⁄ects. Before that, however, we need to
rigorously de￿ne La⁄er e⁄ects and what we mean with "maintaining government
spending".
3 De￿nitions of La⁄er e⁄ects
The de￿nitions of La⁄er e⁄ects follow and extend the work by Agell and Persson
(2001) where di⁄erences between earlier results on dynamic La⁄er e⁄ects were
clari￿ed. It extends this work to a context where there is more than one factor
of production and therefore not only dynamic but also compositional e⁄ects of
taxes. Precisely because the model contains compositional as well as dynamic
distortions, I use the term "La⁄er e⁄ect" instead of "dynamic La⁄er e⁄ect".
Three de￿nitions of La⁄er e⁄ects are presented. De￿nition 1 follows the
Agell and Persson de￿nition whereas de￿nitions 2 and 3 comprise two slightly
di⁄erent cases that collapse into one case in the basic AK framework. The di⁄er-
ence between the three de￿nitions is related to what we mean by "maintaining
government spending". In the model presented so far, a balanced growth path
exists where private consumption, capital stocks and government consumption
and transfers all grow at the same rate. After a tax cut, the return to private
capital ￿ and the growth rate of consumption ￿ increase. We can then either
allow for government consumption and transfers to adjust their growth rate to
the new higher rate or they can maintain their pre tax cut growth rates.
We also need to distinguish between the case where we account for the jump
in production as a result of tax cuts and the case where we do not. After
a tax cut, because the "economy-wide" return ￿ is tax-dependent, period-zero









0 ) ￿ ￿
postz0.
10De￿nition 2 does not take this discrete adjustment into consideration whereas
de￿nition 3 does. That is, in de￿nition 2, because GDP discretely increases as a
result of a tax cut, the transfer-to-GDP ratio goes down for a given period-zero





0 ) in the transfer-to-GDP ratio in de￿nition 2 below. We
do not require T0 to adjust to maintain the original ratio. In de￿nition 3, we





0 ). In the basic AK framework, de￿nitions 2 and 3
collapse into one case only15.
I now state the three de￿nitions and then clarify with an example how they
di⁄er.
De￿nition 1 Assume that the resource constraint
R 1
0 Gte￿￿tdt+c0 (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿1 =




h and ￿ows of government con-
sumption (Gt)1
0 and transfers (Tt)1









h , where at least one of the inequalities should be
strict, that allows the government to maintain its transfer program (Tt)1
0 and
for some time ￿t > 0 increase its consumption ￿ow Gt and not decreasing it at
any other time, there is a La⁄er e⁄ect.
In de￿nition 1, government transfers Tt follow their pre tax cut path, even




is the pre-tax cut growth rate of consumption, GDP and capital stocks and T
pre
0
constitute the pre tax cut period-zero level of transfers. When implementing
de￿nition 1 in this paper, government consumption Gt will also grow at the old
growth rate of private consumption, ￿pre, and we will ask the question whether
period-zero government consumption G0 can increase when a tax is reduced16.
De￿nition 2 Assume that the resource constraint
R 1
0 Gte￿￿tdt+c0 (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿1 =




h and ￿ows of government con-
sumption (Gt)1
0 and transfers (Tt)1









h , where at least one of the inequalities should be
strict, that allows the government to maintain its transfer to GDP ratio, i.e.






0 ), and for







0 ) and not decreasing it at any other time, there is a La⁄er
e⁄ect.
15Regarding notation, the superindices "pre" and "post" refer to the values pre- and post-
tax cut, respectively. The subindex t refers to time, a subindex 0 therefore means the value
at time zero.
16That is, can Gt, as a response to a tax cut, shift up to a higher level and then continue
to grow at its old growth rate but starting at this new higher level so that Gt is permanently
on a higher level than before the tax cut?
11Using the more demanding de￿nition 2, all government spending follows the
new higher growth rate of private consumption and GDP, even after the tax
cut. That is, Tt = T
pre
0 e￿
p ostt and we will let Gt grow at the rate ￿post as well
and we ask the question whether period zero government consumption G0 can
increase when a tax is reduced.
De￿nition 3 Assume that the resource constraint
R 1
0 Gte￿￿tdt+c0 (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿1 =




h and ￿ows of government con-
sumption (Gt)1
0 and transfers (Tt)1









h , where at least one of the inequalities should be
strict, that allows the government to maintain its initial transfer to GDP ratio at






0 ), and for some time ￿t > 0







and not decreasing it at any other time, there is a La⁄er e⁄ect.
Using the even more demanding de￿nition 3, all government spending follows
the new higher growth rate of private consumption, ￿post. In addition, the
new period zero transfers T
post
0 and therefore the whole path of transfers Tt













0 ). We ask the question whether period
zero government consumption G0 can make a discrete adjustment that is larger
than the adjustment in GDP and then grow at the rate ￿post.
To further clarify the di⁄erence between the three de￿nitions, imagine a tax
cut that increases the consumption growth rate from 2% to 3% and as a result
of the tax cut, GDP experiences a 1% discrete jump from 1.00 to 1.01 in period
zero. With de￿nition 1, transfers Tt should not jump in period zero and continue
to grow with 2% and we ask whether period-zero Gt can jump to a higher level
and then grow with 2%.
With de￿nition 2, transfers Tt should also not jump in period zero but then
grow with 3% and we ask whether period-zero Gt can jump to a higher level
and then grow with 3%.
With de￿nition 3, transfers Tt should jump up 1% in period zero and then
grow with 3% and we ask whether period-zero Gt can jump more than 1% and
then grow with 3%.
In the following section, I derive analytical conditions for when La⁄er e⁄ects
of de￿nitions 1 and 2 occur, interpret the results and show that de￿nition 3
e⁄ects can never occur17.
17Ireland (1994) and Novales and Ruiz (2002) use de￿nition 1 in characterizing La⁄er e⁄ects.
124 Conditions to get La⁄er e⁄ects
4.1 Pre tax cut setting
In order to study La⁄er e⁄ects, we start out in a situation at time t = 0
with initial capital z0, zero outstanding government debt (b0 = 0) and gov-









0 . Using the equilibrium expressions for r;w and h=k,
this expression can be written as
T0 + G0 = ￿pre
avg￿
prez0: (17)
Prior to a tax cut GDP, private consumption, capital stocks as well as govern-













where at least one of the inequalities should be strict. For the analytical expres-


























over, we are naturally interested in decreasing the highest tax as this reduces
the compositional distortion in production.
For the subsequent analysis, it will be useful to express the tax-derivatives
of the consumption growth rate ￿ and the economy-wide return to capital ￿
as functions of the tax-derivatives of the private return to capital ￿. A few
































(1 ￿ ￿)(￿k ￿ ￿h)
(1 ￿ ￿avg)
2 : (19)
￿h and ￿k are important factors in the La⁄er e⁄ect analysis. They represent
the second e⁄ect of taxation in the model, the impact of the compositional
distortion from a di⁄erentiated tax treatment of h and k. In (18) and (19), we
get that if ￿h = ￿k, both ￿h and ￿k are zero and ￿ is not tax dependent. A
non-zero value of either ￿h or ￿k means that we have a compositional distortion
and that the maximum production capacity is not achieved (as GDP equals ￿z
from 10). As discussed earlier, tax changes that a⁄ect ￿ will therefore make
available more/less resources in all periods and a⁄ect the possibility for La⁄er
e⁄ects (more resources when we reduce the highest tax which is what we are
13interested in). For future reference, we also note that if ￿h or ￿k are larger than
unity, we get a larger change in the economy-wide return ￿ than in the private
return to capital ￿ when taxes are changed.
4.2 Mathematical criterion
We study under what conditions tax cuts give rise to La⁄er e⁄ects. Let subindex
i refer to either the physical capital or human capital tax. The criterion to
get a La⁄er e⁄ect is @G0=@￿i < 0 for de￿nitions 1 and 2 La⁄er e⁄ects and
@ (G0=GDP)=@￿i < 0 for de￿nition 3 La⁄er e⁄ects.
We now derive what conditions must be ful￿lled in order to get La⁄er e⁄ects
according to de￿nitions 1-2 and then interpret the results, speci￿cally discussing
the compositional e⁄ect that ￿h and ￿k represent. We also show that de￿nition
3 e⁄ects are not possible. Since de￿nition 1 La⁄er e⁄ects are very similar to the
analysis in Agell and Persson (2001), the reader is referred to these authors for
a full discussion.
4.3 La⁄er e⁄ect according to de￿nition 1
Following de￿nition 1, we will let T grow at its pre tax cut growth rate ￿pre and
study scope for increased G. G is set to grow at the original growth rate ￿pre
as well and it is therefore enough to study the impact on G0, G in period zero.
The consumption rule and the present value resource constraint, expressions





￿ ￿ ￿pre (20)
G0




We di⁄erentiate (20) and (21) with respect to either of the tax rates and
study whether such a tax change makes the new G0 comply with the condition
for a La⁄er e⁄ect, @G0=@￿i < 0. A change in taxation will, through its e⁄ect
on growth, the private discount rate and future value of transfers in the ￿rst
constraint a⁄ect c0. This change in c0 then adds to the e⁄ects on the growth
rate and on the economy-wide discount rate in the second constraint to give a
total e⁄ect on G0 such that the resource constraint is always ful￿lled18. Note
18That is; G0 is residually calculated such that the resource constraint always holds.
14that @=@￿i can mean a change in either tax rate, ￿h or ￿k. Di⁄erentiation of



































In (22), tax changes will indirectly a⁄ect G0 through their e⁄ect on c0,
and directly through the change in the growth rate of private consumption
and through the e⁄ect on ￿. The second term in (22) is always positive as
@￿=@￿i < 0; a higher growth rate of private consumption from tax cuts makes
La⁄er e⁄ects more di¢ cult to achieve. The third term comes from the impact
of a tax change on the economy-wide return to capital. A change in ￿, through
a change in compositional distortions that a⁄ects output in all periods, changes
the present value of given ￿ ows of lifetime private and government consump-
tion and thereby the scope for La⁄er e⁄ects. Expression (23) is the standard
consumption response in period-zero consumption through income and substitu-
tion e⁄ects (￿rst term) and wealth e⁄ects of transfers (second term). The wealth
e⁄ect of transfers plays a crucial role in the possibility to get La⁄er e⁄ects20.
We sum up the e⁄ects from (22) and (23) and rewrite. @G0=@￿i is a sum of
the growth e⁄ects (@￿=@￿i) on the two di⁄erent present values of consumption
and the e⁄ects through the di⁄erent returns to capital. The condition to get a




























Using relationships (18) and (19) between changes in ￿, ￿ and ￿ gives
19We di⁄erentiate with respect to a tax and then evaluate the derivative in the pre tax-cut
point.
20From 23, c0 is a⁄ected through the change in the portion of lifetime income consumed in
the ￿rst period (￿ ￿ ￿) and through the change in valuation of lifetime transfers T0=(￿ ￿ ￿pre).
If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ￿￿1 is less than unity, the income e⁄ect dominates
the substitution e⁄ect and the ￿rst term is negative. The second term is the wealth e⁄ect
and is always positive. It will act to reduce period-zero consumption when taxes are reduced
because future transfers are worth less as a result of the tax cut. The wealth e⁄ect from















c0 + (￿i ￿ 1)(c0 ￿ T0)
￿
< 0: (25)
From (25), because @￿=@￿i < 0 and ￿ ￿ ￿ > 0, there are two possible cases
giving a La⁄er e⁄ect:
Proposition 1 There is a La⁄er e⁄ect, @G0=@￿i < 0, in the sense of de￿nition








or if ￿i > 1:
The ￿rst part of proposition 1 is written to stress the importance of transfers
and the wealth e⁄ect that results from tax cuts. It simpli￿es to the case of the
AK-model when taxes are equal, i.e. when ￿i = 0, meaning that there is only a
dynamic and no compositional margin. The proposition then tells us how large
a share of consumption that should be transfer-￿nanced to get a dynamic La⁄er
e⁄ect21.
We postpone the discussion of the criterion ￿i > 1, proceed to the proposi-
tion regarding de￿nition 2 La⁄er e⁄ects and then interpret the results.
4.4 La⁄er e⁄ect according to de￿nition 2
With government transfers and consumption following the (higher) growth rate
of private consumption after a tax cut, the present value budget and resource
constraints, (14) and (16), simplify to become
c0 = z0 (￿ ￿ ￿) + T0 (26)
G0 = z0 (￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ c0: (27)
The condition to get a La⁄er e⁄ect is, once more, @G0=@￿i < 0. Di⁄erenti-














(￿i ￿ 1): (28)
Because @￿=@￿i < 0, we arrive at the following proposition:
21See Agell and Persson (2001) for a full discussion.
16Proposition 2 There is a La⁄er e⁄ect, @G0=@￿i < 0, in the sense of de￿nition
(2) if ￿i > 1:
4.5 Interpretation of La⁄er e⁄ects
As expected, de￿nition 1 La⁄er e⁄ects are the easiest to obtain. We only require
government spending to grow at the old growth rate, whereas for de￿nition 2
government spending should grow at the new higher growth rate that follows
from a tax cut. We see that a positive ￿i in the ￿rst part of proposition 1
reduces the requirement on the transfer/consumption ratio in order to obtain
a La⁄er e⁄ect. This is because a tax cut reduces the compositional distortion,
thus helping the self-￿nancing of a tax cut. The second part of proposition 1 is
the same as proposition 2 and we now analyze the requirement for a de￿nition
2 e⁄ect, ￿i > 1, in more detail.
If we combine the intertemporal constraints (26) and (27), we get T0+G0 =
(￿ ￿ ￿)z0. Because (￿ ￿ ￿) = ￿￿avg (from 11), this is nothing but the time-zero
budget constraint of the government from (17). Since all variables grow at the
same rate, the dynamic constraint collapses to the static government budget
constraint. The reason is that with the assumptions on c, T and G growing at
the same growth rate, for the optimal solution also total capital z will grow at
the same rate and no bonds will ever be issued. That is, if we are in a condition
to get a dynamic La⁄er e⁄ect, ￿i > 1, no bonds are needed; G0 will be residually
determined to ful￿ll the present value (and static) resource constraint. If we are
not in a condition to get a dynamic La⁄er e⁄ect, ￿i < 1, if bonds were to be
issued they could not be recovered (we would violate a transversality condition)
and there is no way for G0 complying with @G0=@￿i < 0 to ful￿ll the present
value resource constraint.
If we maximize static government revenue ￿￿avg keeping one tax constant
(say ￿k), we get the condition that ￿h should ful￿ll ￿h = 1 for maximum
revenue. For ￿h > 1; we are below maximum tax revenue. Therefore, the
condition for de￿nition 2 La⁄er e⁄ects is the same as a static government revenue
maximization problem. If ￿h is beyond the point where ￿h = 1, we are at the
wrong side of the ￿h-La⁄er curve (graph below) and can hence increase revenue
by reducing ￿h. From the graph, we see that if the physical capital tax stands
at ￿k = 0:3, a human capital tax above 0:75 would be needed to get a de￿nition
2 La⁄er e⁄ect. As seen in the graph, this result is not very sensitive to the value
of ￿.













Figure 1. The ￿h-La⁄er curve for two di⁄erent values of ￿ when ￿k = 0:3. (The
shape of these curves does not depend on A which is set to 1 in this graph)
The analysis above tells us that there are two sources for La⁄er e⁄ects, com-
positional and dynamic. In our model, where there are no transitional dynamics
but immediate adjustment in the h=k-ratio, the compositional e⁄ect is static.
As a result of a tax change, the agent immediately reoptimizes the h=k-ratio
according to (8) and there is an immediate adjustment in the returns to capital
and the consumption growth rate. Production ￿z will "jump" through the dis-
crete adjustment in ￿ and more resources are made available in all periods. This
compositional e⁄ect makes it easier for the government to maintain spending
and it is possible to get a de￿nition 2 La⁄er e⁄ect. The dynamic La⁄er e⁄ect
is captured by de￿nition 1. Here, because of a less stringent requirement on
spending and an increased growth rate of consumption and the capital stock,
there is a true dynamic e⁄ect of tax cuts.
The interpretation of La⁄er e⁄ects as compositional and dynamic is likely
to carry over to the more general two-sector model with separate production
functions for physical and human capital. Our model is a special case of this
two-sector model; we have assumed one production function for both physical
and human capital and immediate adjustment in the stocks of h and k. These
assumptions have allowed us to separate compositional from dynamic e⁄ects.
In the general model, along a balanced growth path, the h=k-ratio will also be
constant. A tax change will result in a period of transition where the ratio - or
composition - readjusts to the new tax rates. A tax cut in these models also
generates the growth e⁄ect, which is the source of the dynamic La⁄er e⁄ects.
We state a ￿nal proposition regarding La⁄er e⁄ects and then proceed to
18studying what the introduction of a labor/leisure choice implies for the analysis
of La⁄er e⁄ects.
4.6 La⁄er e⁄ect according to de￿nition 3
With de￿nition 3, total government spending should increase as a fraction of
GDP22. It is straightforward to show that this can never be possible. Rewrite
(27) using (26) to get
G0 = z0 (￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ T0 = ￿￿avgz0 ￿ T0:







We are interested in the sign of @ (G0=GDP)=@￿i. If we reduce either
tax rate, the factor ￿avg will decrease. If the T0=GDP-ratio is to remain in-
tact, the left-hand side must then decrease as a result of the tax cut, i.e.
@ (G0=GDP)=@￿i > 0. We are thus in a case where there are no dynamic
or compositional margins from which resources for increased government con-
sumption can be generated and we get the following result;
Proposition 3 There can never be a La⁄er e⁄ect, @ (G0=GDP)=@￿i < 0, in
the sense of de￿nition (3).
5 Adding leisure to the model
So far in this paper we have seen how capital taxation in general and an uneven
taxation of factors of production in particular a⁄ect the scope for self-￿nancing
tax cuts. When a tax is reduced, dynamic and compositional margins are af-
fected and there may be La⁄er e⁄ects. There is symmetry between changes in
￿k and ￿h. In this section, I extend the model by introducing a labor/leisure
choice and leisure in the agent￿ s utility function. I follow most of the literature
and model leisure as "raw-time", where human capital and leisure are bundled
together and the human capital e⁄ectively supplied for production is h(1 ￿ l)
22Increasing the total government spending (G + T) to GDP ratio is equivalent to asking
whether G can increase as a fraction of the new GDP, letting T increase to exactly preserve
its GDP ratio.
19rather than h. Here, (1￿l) is the fraction of the unitary time endowment used
for labor and l is leisure time23.
Before presenting the extended model, we can say something about what
results we expect. First, we should expect the scope for La⁄er e⁄ects to increase
because we have a new margin of adjustment. As we will see, the growth rate in
this model will be increasing in the level of labor time. Therefore, a tax cut that
increases labor time adds a new dynamic margin which is indeed a new source
of a dynamic La⁄er e⁄ect. Second, there is also a new compositional e⁄ect.
If labor time and therefore production increase in response to a tax cut, this
also opens up for La⁄er e⁄ects (although we also need to consider the general
equilibrium response in the h=k-ratio).
We should also expect the introduction of leisure to break the symmetry
between the two taxes. In particular, the agent will be faced with an intratem-
poral allocation decision between consumption and leisure. This decision will
be directly a⁄ected by the tax on human capital, whereas the physical capital
tax will only have indirect e⁄ects on the consumption/leisure decision.
A limitation in the analysis is that the method to integrate the budget and
resource constraints will no longer be easily applicable for de￿nition 1 La⁄er
e⁄ects. This is due to the fact that no constant-leisure level will exist other
than in the long run when we have variables growing at di⁄erent growth rates.
An analytical condition for de￿nition 1 La⁄er e⁄ects with leisure will therefore
not be provided. We can, however, get the intuition for de￿nition 1 La⁄er e⁄ects,
discussing how a tax cut has a⁄ected the growth rate through the leisure level.
For de￿nition 2 La⁄er e⁄ects, we will get a solution where leisure jumps from one
constant level to another as taxes change. This means that consumption, capital
stocks, government consumption and government transfers can all grow at the
same rate and we can analyze the compositional e⁄ect of having introduced
leisure24,25.
5.1 The model with leisure
I limit the model description here to what has changed from above. A fraction
l of the agent￿ s unitary time endowment will be removed from production. The
23See Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998a) for a discussion of di⁄erent speci￿cations of leisure.
We also refer to these authors for a full discussion of the problem set-up and ￿rst-order
conditions. Our model is a special case of their model, the case when the production functions
for physical and human capital are the same.
24We use a utility function that is consistent with a steady state with a constant leisure
level as derived by King et al. (1988).
25The de￿nitions of La⁄er e⁄ects remain the same. For de￿nition 2 e⁄ects, this still means
that if there is such an e⁄ect, it will be compositional in nature. Leisure in the model may
change the way the growth rate responds to tax cuts. This change in growth rate also applies
to government spending, however.
20remaining part of the time endowment, (1 ￿ l), will be used in production so that
e⁄ective human capital supplied in production is h(1￿l) and w = @f=@(h(1￿l))
will be the return to e⁄ective human capital. We can proceed with the model
setup from above, but we need to replace h with h(1 ￿ l) in the production
function and in the budget constraint26. We continue suppressing time indices
on the variables and, in order to not introduce additional confounding notation,
we use the same symbols w, r, ￿, ￿, ￿ as above. As an example, w is still the
return to human capital but its expression will be slightly di⁄erent from above
because of the introduction of leisure in the model.
The arbitrage condition (1) now becomes
r(1 ￿ ￿k) = w(1 ￿ l)(1 ￿ ￿h): (29)
From this condition, we derive the h=k-ratio, which will still be h=k = ￿.
It is una⁄ected by the introduction of leisure, but we note that part of the
human capital stock is no longer deployed27. Knowing h=k, we can derive the
expressions for the private return ￿ and the economy-wide return ￿. These
will look as in the no-leisure case, (2) and (11), but will now include a leisure
component (1 ￿ l)
1￿￿:






From these expressions, we see that the introduction of leisure has a⁄ected
the returns to capital in the economy. The fact that not all human capital is
deployed in production has a negative e⁄ect on the return to capital and, as
we shall see, the growth rate. It follows that changes in leisure, induced by tax
cuts, will a⁄ect the scope for La⁄er e⁄ects. In particular, it seems likely that
decreases in the leisure level from tax cuts, @l=@￿i > 0, will act as a new margin
that increases the scope for self-￿nancing tax cuts both through more human
capital deployed in production and through a higher growth rate28. This growth
e⁄ect is in addition to the positive e⁄ect on the growth rate from the tax cut
26When we solved the representative agent￿ s problem in the non-leisure section, we ￿rst
derived the non-arbitrage condition between k and h and then worked with the state variable
W (or equivalently, z and b) in the optimization set-up.
With leisure, h is now replaced by h(1 ￿ l). There are ￿rst-order e⁄ects of changes in l and
we need to explicitly express the return to capital in the budget constraint, i.e. hw (1 ￿ l)(1￿
￿h) + kr(1 ￿ ￿k).
27A fraction l of human capital h is no longer productive. The return on e⁄ective human
capital h(1 ￿ l) has increased and the return on k has decreased. The h=k-ratio that satis￿es
condition (29) remains intact. The fraction of human capital used in production, i.e. h(1￿l)=k,
has decreased, though, which is what we should expect.
28The total (general equilibrium) e⁄ect also needs to take the change in the h=k-ratio into
account.
21itself and thus constitutes an additional margin for de￿nition 1, or dynamic,
La⁄er e⁄ects.
Although no explicit expression for de￿nition 1 La⁄er e⁄ects and no propo-
sition corresponding to proposition 1 are presented, it is thus likely that the
requirement to have a de￿nition 1 La⁄er e⁄ect is less stringent than in the
no-leisure case.
We now de￿ne a utility function and proceed to analytically characterizing
de￿nition 2 La⁄er e⁄ects. The utility function is additively separable in the
private goods (c;l) and government consumption (G), U (c;l;G) = u(c;l)+v(G).







King et al. (1988) have shown this utility function to be consistent with
a balanced growth path with constant leisure. The parameter ￿ indicates the
relative preference for consumption. The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to
consumption and leisure imply that the marginal rate of substitution should
equate the relative price:
ul
uc
= wh(1 ￿ ￿h): (30)
The human capital tax has a direct e⁄ect on this trade-o⁄ through its direct
e⁄ect on the relative price of leisure. Both ￿h and ￿k also indirectly a⁄ect the
trade-o⁄through changes in w and h. We can see the full tax-dependence in the
consumption/leisure trade-o⁄ by rewriting (30) using the utility function and
the general equilibrium expressions for w and h:
c
l(1 ￿ l)￿￿ =
￿(1 ￿ ￿h)2￿￿(1 ￿ ￿k)￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿k) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿h)
: (31)
Here, ￿ is a function of the capital stock z and the non-tax parameters of the
problem29. The right-hand side is unambiguously decreasing in ￿h and it is also
decreasing in ￿k if ￿k > ￿h which is the case when we study reductions in ￿k.
Moreover, it can be shown that the size of the e⁄ect on the intratemporal margin





22of ￿h). From these considerations, we can conclude that the consumption-to-
leisure ratio increases for tax cuts that are such that the highest tax is reduced
and the ratio increases more for reductions in ￿h than for reductions in ￿k. We
are thus lead to expect the largest jump in the leisure level from reductions in
￿h and possibly a larger scope for La⁄er e⁄ects if in a situation with ￿h > ￿k
than from reducing ￿k when ￿k > ￿h.
We still need to derive the intertemporal conditions, both to get a second
relationship between c and l from the consumption rule and to get the present
value resource constraint from which we study La⁄er e⁄ects. The Euler equation
is once again derived from ￿rst-order conditions similar to (5) and (6), where
the utility function and ￿ now also include leisure. With ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)
￿1,






￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) = ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿): (32)
With constant leisure, the Euler equation reduces to ￿ ￿
_ c
c
= ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
and the method of integrating the budget and resource constraints remains
valid. The Euler equation looks as before but the "intertemporal elasticity
of substitution" ￿ now equals (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)
￿1. It collapses to ￿
￿1 when the
representative agent only values consumption (￿ = 1). With the Euler equation
derived, we can proceed to derive the conditions for de￿nition 2 La⁄er e⁄ects
using the same method as in the section without leisure.
5.2 La⁄er e⁄ect according to de￿nition 2 ￿with leisure
The expressions for the consumption rule and the present value resource con-
straint from (26) and (27) remain valid; they maintain their simple form because
any adjustment in the growth rate also applies to government transfers T and
government consumption G. The only di⁄erence is the factor (1 ￿ l)
1￿￿ now
present in ￿, ￿ and ￿. We repeat these expressions for convenience:
c0 = z0 (￿ ￿ ￿) + T0 (33)
G0 = z0 (￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ c0: (34)
To get an explicit expression for La⁄er e⁄ects, we ￿rst need to solve for c
and l from the intratemporal (equation 31) and intertemporal (equation 33)
23relationships. Implicitly, however, we can follow the procedure from the non-
leisure section in that we di⁄erentiate (34) and (33) to obtain the condition
for de￿nition 2 La⁄er e⁄ects. That is, we calculate the derivative @G0=@￿i =
z0 (@￿=@￿i ￿ @￿=@￿i) as in (28), without ￿rst solving for the leisure level, ex-
plicitly recognizing that ￿ and ￿ contain the factor (1 ￿ l)
1￿￿ where l is tax-
dependent. This means that the proposition will contain the leisure level itself,
a variable for which we have not yet solved. It turns out that we can draw
qualitative conclusions from the analysis if we manage to determine how leisure
reacts to tax changes, i.e. the sign of @l=@￿i.
From the criterion for a La⁄er e⁄ect, @G0=@￿i < 0, we get the following
proposition, using the auxiliary positive parameter ￿i
30:
Proposition 4 In the case with leisure, there is a La⁄er e⁄ect, @G0=@￿i < 0,




The di⁄erence between propositions (4) and (2) is the term ￿i@l=@￿i=(1 ￿ l).
The scope for a de￿nition 2 La⁄er e⁄ect is larger or smaller in the model with
leisure depending on the sign of the leisure derivative with respect to the tax
rate. A positive tax derivative, @l=@￿i > 0, produces a larger change in ￿
than in ￿, as compared to the non-leisure case, thereby facilitating the desired
@￿=@￿i￿@￿=@￿i < 0. The opposite holds for a negative tax derivative, @l=@￿i <
0. The earlier requirement that the compositional distortion must be such that
￿i > 1 in order to get a de￿nition 2 La⁄er e⁄ect is thus "relaxed" when there
is leisure in the model (if @l=@￿i > 0) because a tax cut also helps through the
leisure margin.
5.3 Interpretation of La⁄er e⁄ects, with leisure
The introduction of leisure into the model has opened up a new channel for
dynamic as well as compositional La⁄er e⁄ects. Although we do not study
de￿nition 1 La⁄er e⁄ects in this section, due to analytical complexity, we see
that the labor/leisure level a⁄ects the growth rate. The private return ￿ ￿
A￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿k)￿(1 ￿ ￿h)1￿￿ (1 ￿ l)
1￿￿ and therefore the growth rate,
￿ = ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿), will increase as either tax ￿i is reduced. If @l=@￿i > 0, there is
an additional boost to the growth rate. This is a new dynamic e⁄ect. It is likely
to make it easier for the government to maintain its spending path according to
La⁄er e⁄ect de￿nition 1, as compared to the no-leisure case.
As for de￿nition 2 e⁄ects, we once again get an expression for the com-










24@l=@￿i > 0, which is likely to be the case at least for the human capital tax,
the agent will work more and production will increase. We start out in a situa-
tion with production ￿z where ￿ is increasing in labor time (1 ￿ l). This e⁄ect
comes in addition to any e⁄ect through the h=k-ratio which, as previously, is
determined by ￿. Thus, we have a new compositional margin that may increase
production and therefore be a source of de￿nition 2 La⁄er e⁄ects. This is what
is captured by proposition (4) above.
In the appendix, we solve for the leisure level from (33) and (31). This
can only be done for certain values of ￿ and the analysis is therefore sugges-
tive at most. We show that the leisure-to-tax derivatives, comparing situa-
tions such as @l=@￿h=(1 ￿ l) when (￿h;￿k)=(0:5;0:3) with @l=@￿k=(1 ￿ l) when










Therefore, changes in the human capital tax are likely to be more e⁄ective in
creating La⁄er e⁄ects. This applies to both the dynamic and the compositional
part of the e⁄ect. Figure 2 below illustrates the left- and right-hand sides of
proposition (4) where the ￿i-term, i.e. the left-hand side, should be larger than
the leisure term 1￿￿i@l=@￿i=(1 ￿ l) for there to be a de￿nition 2 La⁄er e⁄ect.
The left graph is for reductions in ￿k and the right graph is for reductions in
￿h. In the left graph, we ￿x ￿h at 30% and vary ￿k above this rate. In the right
graph, we ￿x ￿k at 30% and vary ￿h above this rate31.
Figure 2. Requirements on ￿k to get a La⁄er e⁄ect when ￿h is ￿xed at 30%
(left graph) and requirements on ￿h to get a La⁄er e⁄ect when ￿k is ￿xed at
30% (right graph). When leisure is in the model, the requirement on the tax
rate to get a La⁄er e⁄ect moves from the intersection of the ￿-term and "1" to
the intersection of the ￿-term and the leisure-term.
The graphs show what level of tax rates is required for de￿nition 2 La⁄er
e⁄ects, both in the model with and without leisure, when one tax rate is kept at
30%. The requirements are lower when leisure is endogenous. To the right of the
31Parameters are: ￿ = 0:5, A = 0:1, ￿ = 2, ￿ = 0:7, ￿ = 0:02 and half of government
revenue goes to transfers.
25￿-leisure intersection, we have a La⁄er e⁄ect. This occurs at around ￿k = 70%
in the left graph; above this level reducing ￿k produces a La⁄er e⁄ect. For the
right graph, above ￿h = 50% we get a La⁄er e⁄ect for reductions in ￿h. In the
model without leisure, we have a La⁄er e⁄ect to the right of the intersection
between the ￿-curve and "1". This is also illustrated in the graphs and occurs
at higher tax rates (i.e. larger compositional distortions). The graphs also show
that the e⁄ects of introducing leisure are larger for the human capital tax.
We conclude the leisure section by stating that La⁄er e⁄ects according to
de￿nition 3 are not possible in the case with leisure. The reasoning from propo-
sition 3 remains unchanged.
Proposition 5 In the case with leisure, there can never be a La⁄er e⁄ect,
@ (G0=GDP)=@￿i < 0, in the sense of de￿nition (3).
266 Discussion
In the general version of the two-sector model, there is a separate sector accu-
mulating human capital. An endogenous labor/leisure choice is also standard
in such models. As a result of tax cuts, a period of transitional dynamics fol-
lows, during which stocks of human and physical capital allocated to each sector
readjust. There is also an increase in the growth rate. In this paper, I have
made simplifying assumptions regarding technology and the transition phase in
order to separate di⁄erent e⁄ects arising from tax cuts.
First, there are adjustments along a dynamic margin from the tax cut itself
￿ the growth rate increases. This opens up for dynamic La⁄er e⁄ects if we
assume that government spending grows at its pre tax cut growth rate. With
endogenous leisure, the growth rate also increases because more human capital
is deployed, this is a second source of a dynamic La⁄er e⁄ect.
Second, there are adjustments along a compositional margin if we have more
than one factor of production. Tax cuts change the human to capital equilibrium
composition. This a⁄ects production and is a source of La⁄er e⁄ects. The level
of leisure also changes as a result of the tax cut. This also changes production
and is a second source of a compositional La⁄er e⁄ect.
Compositional and dynamic distortions need to be quite large in order to get
a La⁄er e⁄ect. Fixing one tax rate at 30%, the other tax rate must be above 70%
if a reduction in this higher tax is to be self-￿nancing (for one parametrization
of the model). If leisure is in the model, this requirement goes down. Through
the direct e⁄ect on the consumption/leisure trade-o⁄, a human capital tax cut
produces a direct e⁄ect which is not present for a physical capital tax cut.
Therefore, human capital tax cuts are a more likely source of La⁄er e⁄ects
when there is leisure in the model. For one parametrization, ￿xing the physical
capital tax rate at 30% requires the human capital tax rate to be above 50% to
get a La⁄er e⁄ect (instead of above 70% when leisure is not in the model).
277 References
Agell, J., Persson, M., 2001. On the analytics of the dynamic La⁄er curve.
Journal of Monetary Economics 48, 397-414
Auerbach, A. J. 2005. Dynamic Scoring: An Introduction to the Issues. Amer-
ican Economic Review 95, 421￿ 425.
Barro, R. J., Sala-i-Martin, X., 1995, Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Bianconi, M., 2000. The e⁄ects of alternative ￿scal policies on the intertem-
poral government budget constraint. International Review of Economics
and Finance 9, 31￿ 52
Bruce, N., Turnovsky, S.J., 1999. Budget balance, welfare, and the growth
rate: ￿dynamic scoring￿of the long-run government budget. Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 31, 162￿ 186
Devereux, M. B., Love, D. R. F., 1994. The e⁄ects of factor taxation in a two-
sector model of endogenous growth. The Canadian Journal of Economics
27, 509-536
Goulder, L., Thalman, P., 1993. Approaches to e¢ cient capital taxation: Lev-
eling the playing ￿eld vs. living by the golden rule. Journal of Public
Economics 50, 169￿ 196
Ireland, P.N., 1994. Supply-side economics and endogenous growth. Journal
of Monetary Economics 33, 559￿ 571
King, R.G., Plosser, C., Rebelo, S., 1988. Production, growth and business
cycles. II. New directions. Journal of Monetary Economics 21, 309￿ 341
King, R.G., Rebelo, S., 1990. Public policy and economic growth: developing
neoclassical implications. Journal of Political Economy 98, 126￿ 150
Leeper, E. M., Yang, S., 2007. Dynamic Scoring: Alternative ￿nancing schemes.
NBER Working Paper 12103
Lucas, R.E., 1988. On the mechanics of Economic Development. Journal of
Monetary Economics 22, 3-42
Lucas, R.E., 1990. Supply-side economics: an analytical review. Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers 42, 293￿ 316
Mankiw, N.G., Weinzierl, M., 2005. Dynamic scoring: A back-of-the-envelope
guide. Journal of Public Economics 90, 1415-1433
Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., Roubini, N., 1998a. On the taxation of human and phys-
ical capital in models of endogenous growth. Journal of Public Economics
70, 237￿ 254
28Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., Roubini, N., 1998b. Growth e⁄ects of income and con-
sumption taxes. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 30, 721￿ 744
Novales, A., Ruiz, J., 2002. Dynamic La⁄er curves. Journal of Economic
Dynamics & Control 27, 181-206
Pecorino, P., 1993. Tax structure and growth in a model with human capital.
Journal of Public Economics 52, 251-271
Pecorino, P., 1994. The Growth Rate E⁄ects of Tax Reform. Oxford Economic
Papers 46, 492-501
Pecorino, P., 1995. Tax rates and tax revenues in a model of growth through
human capital accumulation. Journal of Monetary Economics 36, 527￿ 539
Rebelo, S., 1991. Long-Run Policy Analysis and Long-Run Growth. The
Journal of Political Economy 99, 500￿ 521
Stokey, N.L., Rebelo, S., 1995. Growth e⁄ects of ￿ at-rate taxes. The Journal
of Political Economy 103, 519￿ 550
298 Appendix
8.1 Variables and parameters
c is consumption
l is leisure
k is the agent￿ s physical capital stock
h is the agent￿ s human capital stock
z = k + h is the agent￿ s total capital stock
z0 = k0 + h0 is the agent·s total initial capital stock
b is the agent￿ s government bond stock
b0 = 0 is the agent￿ s initial government bond stock
W is the agent￿ s total wealth
W0 = z0 is the agent￿ s initial wealth
T is the government lump-sum transfer to the agent
G is government consumption
r is the market rate of return on physical capital
w is the market rate of return on human capital
￿ is the rate of time preference of the agent
￿k is the physical capital and government bond income tax
￿h is the human capital income tax
￿
￿1 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in the no-leisure case
￿ is the relative preference for consumption in the utility function
(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)
￿1 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in the leisure case
￿ is the relative weight of physical capital in production (0 < ￿ < 1)
A is a constant in the production function






￿ = A￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿k)￿(1 ￿ ￿h)1￿￿ in the no-leisure case and
￿ = A￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿k)￿(1 ￿ ￿h)1￿￿(1 ￿ l)1￿￿ in the leisure-case
￿ = ￿







is the economy-wide return to capital
￿k =
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿k ￿ ￿h)
(1 ￿ ￿avg)













8.2 Relationship to the general two-sector model
The model in this paper uses two assumptions regarding the production function
and reversibility of investments that require some motivation. In discussing
these assumptions and their implications below we are very brief, and refer
30details to the work by Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998a, 1998b) and papers
referenced therein32. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) also discuss the model used
here. For simplicity, I discuss the model assumptions in a setting without leisure.
The ￿rst assumption is that output and human capital are produced with the
same production function. Second, there are no restrictions on deinvestment in
the stocks of H and K.
For the ￿rst assumption, consider the general model where output is pro-
duced with the following production function, Y = AK (vK)
￿1 (uH)
1￿￿1 and
human capital is produced with _ H = AH ((1 ￿ v)K)
￿2 ((1 ￿ u)H)
1￿￿2. Phys-
ical capital input is divided according to vK used for ￿nal good production
and (1 ￿ v)K for human capital production and there is a similar division
of human capital input. As discussed at some length in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995), this model is di¢ cult to analyze in its general version. If
￿1 = ￿2 ￿ ￿, however, things simplify a lot. From the ￿rst-order conditions,
we get that when ￿1 = ￿2, the marginal impact of increasing the fraction v
has the same impact on ￿nal good production relative to human capital pro-
duction as an additional unit of u has on output production relative to hu-
man capital production. Therefore, v = u so that irrespective of the global
H=K-ratio, an equal fraction of each stock is deployed in ￿nal good produc-
tion and the rest in human capital production. As a consequence, the relative
price of human capital produced to ￿nal good produced is una⁄ected by the
global H=K-ratio and it is also una⁄ected by v (because u adjusts to always
be equal to v). The relative price is therefore constant and being equal to
p = AK=AH. Broad output can therefore be simpli￿ed to become Q ￿ Y +p _ H =
AK (vK)
￿ (vH)
1￿￿ + pAH ((1 ￿ v)K)
￿ ((1 ￿ v)H)
1￿￿ = AKK￿H1￿￿. This is
the "broad" production function used in this paper.
The second assumption is that the model does not exhibit any transitional
dynamics. The relative price of human to physical capital is constant and a
unit of physical capital can be "deinvested" and instantaneously converted into
a unit of human capital. Transitional dynamics could be included in the model
by adding non-negativity constraints on capital accumulation. Outside the bal-
anced growth H=K-ratio, the stock which is relatively abundant would remain
constant for a ￿nite time whereas the other stock would catch up until the
equilibrium ratio is reached. Although there are interesting properties of this
32Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998a, 1998b) study growth responses from capital taxation
in a catalogue of models using physical and human capital as factors of production and in
which there is a di⁄erent technology for producing human capital than for the ￿nal good.
They use di⁄erent versions of production functions in the two sectors; they separate the two
cases where human capital is or is not a market activity and also elaborate on di⁄erent leisure
speci￿cations.
In the terminology of Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini, our model falls under the category "raw-
time" leisure, human capital is a market good and physical and human capital are produced
with the same production function. The paper by Novales and Ruiz (2002), on the other
hand, falls under the category "raw-time leisure", human capital is a non-market activity and
human and physical capital are produced with di⁄erent production functions.
31transition, it is not the objective of this paper and it would considerably com-
plicate the analysis of La⁄er e⁄ects.
The assumption of ￿1 = ￿2 means that human capital production is as
intensive in physical capital input as is the production of output. A more
realistic assumption is that human capital is relatively intensive in human capital
input, ￿2 < ￿1. This is the Uzawa-Lucas model and in its extreme version
￿2 = 0 such that _ H = AH (1 ￿ u)H. Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998a),
King and Rebelo (1990) and Rebelo (1991) all discuss this model with respect
to capital taxation. Growth along the balanced growth path will be driven by
human capital accumulation and in the case of a taxed human capital sector, the
growth rate is a function of ￿h but not of ￿k. Changes in ￿k will cause changes
in the H=K-ratio used in producing output, but will not a⁄ect the growth rate.
For La⁄er e⁄ects, only the human capital tax has a dynamic e⁄ect. Presumably;
in the intermediate model with 0 < ￿2 < ￿1, the lower is ￿2, the more important
is ￿h for the possibility to obtain La⁄er e⁄ects, although ￿k plays some role.
In the case with ￿1 = ￿2; there is complete symmetry between the two taxes
(absent leisure).
8.3 Analytical solution with leisure
By combining the intertemporal relation (33) with the time-zero version of the
intratemporal constraint (31), we eliminate consumption and get one equation
in one unknown33, the time-zero leisure level l0:
l0 (C1 + C2) = C2 + C3 (1 ￿ l0)
￿ :
This equation cannot be solved in the general case but we solve it for the
special cases of ￿ = 1=2 and (the more realistic) ￿ = 1=3. The leisure level is a
non-trivial function of initial transfers T0 to initial capital z0 and all parameters
including the tax rates34, l(T0=z0;A;￿;￿;￿;￿h;￿k). It can be di⁄erentiated,
however, so that we get analytical expressions for the tax derivatives @l=@￿h




Az0￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)2￿￿(1 ￿ ￿h)2￿￿(1 ￿ ￿k)￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿k) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿h)
C2 = A
￿
1 ￿ (1 + ￿￿ ￿ ￿)￿1
￿




+ ￿(1 + ￿￿ ￿ ￿)￿1














Because l is constant, we drop the subindex 0.
32and @l=@￿k. The Mathematica software is used for these calculations as well as
when solving for the case of ￿ = 1=3.
When we calculate @l=@￿h we set ￿h > ￿k and vice versa when computing
@l=@￿k. This is done because we are interested in tax cuts where we decrease
the highest tax. As an example, if we use ￿h=0.5 and ￿k=0.3 to evaluate l and
@l=@￿h to get the term @l=@￿h=(1 ￿ l), we compare this tax cut to a situation
where we use ￿k=0.5 and ￿h=0.3 to evaluate l and @l=@￿k to get the term
@l=@￿k=(1 ￿ l).
As discussed in the main text, the intratemporal condition (31) is such that
an increase in either tax makes the agent substitute consumption for leisure.
In the intertemporal relationship (33), a tax cut will reduce the consumption
level for a constant leisure level (for ￿ < 1). The full intertemporal e⁄ect also
depends on the reaction of the leisure level to the tax cut, so we cannot draw a
clear conclusion of the sign. However, the relationship between c and l in (33) is
symmetric in the tax rates, so that any di⁄erence in the response in l between
changes in ￿h and ￿k will be due to the intratemporal constraint.
Having taken derivatives, we derive comparative statics of l and @l=@￿i with
respect to the variables (T0=z0,A, ￿, ￿, ￿) varying one parameter at a time35.
The main results can be summarized as follows
- As expected, the level of leisure l is decreasing in the preference for con-
sumption ￿. It is also decreasing in A so that the substitution e⁄ect dominates
and the agent works more when A increases.
- From the intertemporal constraint (33), period zero consumption is increas-
ing in the time preference factor ￿ and in T0=z0. The intratemporal c=l-ratio
is not a⁄ected, however, meaning that leisure must also be increasing in ￿ and
T0=z0.
- The only ambiguous comparative static is with respect to ￿ as it will depend
on the preference parameter ￿. For low values of ￿, the leisure level is decreasing
in ￿ and for high values of ￿, leisure is increasing in ￿36.
For the parametrizations of (￿k, ￿h, T0=z0,A, ￿, ￿, ￿) and for both values of
￿, we get the result that
35Typical parameter values are 0:1 ￿ A ￿ 0:5, 1:1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 5, 0:1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:9, 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:05. In
doing the comparative statics, T0=z0 can be no higher than ￿avg￿ which is the case when all
government revenue is used for transfers. Choosing T0=z0 thus amounts to choosing the ratio
of government revenue that is used for transfers and we let this ratio vary between 0:1 and
0:9. Furthermore, we set the lowest tax rate at 0:3 and increase the other tax up to 0:9. We
always check that there is positive growth and that the transversality condition holds.
36From ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)￿1, we see that low values of ￿ make ￿ very close to unity, substi-
tution and income e⁄ects cancel out, and the fraction of lifetime wealth that is consumed in
period zero is (￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿. The e⁄ect of a change in ￿ is then mainly to make the e⁄ective
time discount factor larger, increasing consumption in period zero and also leisure (through
the intratemporal constraint that has not changed). For large values of ￿, even small increases
in ￿ will lead to large changes in ￿ so that the fraction of lifetime wealth consumed in period
zero now decreases in ￿. Period zero consumption will then decrease in ￿ and so will the











In most cases also @l=@￿k=(1 ￿ l) is positive. At least for the parametriza-
tions used we can thus say that, in order to get a La⁄er e⁄ect, a human capital
tax cut helps a great deal more than a physical capital tax cut. The model thus
delivers what the basic intuition tells us, i.e. that the direct e⁄ect on the price
of leisure creates a larger e⁄ect on the leisure level from human capital tax cuts
than from physical capital tax cuts. The lower level of leisure delivered by the
tax cut then helps producing a de￿nition 2 La⁄er e⁄ect according to proposition
4.
34